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CASE COMMENT
BANKRUPTCY LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Supreme Court Denies
Indigents Access to the Courts
INTRODUCTION
The courthouse door which was opened ever so slightly by the
United States Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut' has now
been closed by the Court in United States v. Kras.2 In Kras, the
Court held that an indigent who filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy could not proceed without prepayment of the necessary fees.'
This decision postpones indefinitely any recognition of a general
right of access to the courts for the poor.
Robert Kras sought a discharge in bankruptcy from over $6,000
in debts in an effort to relieve himself of financial insolvency and
creditor harassment.' His economic difficulties were clear. Unem-
ployed for two years, except for odd jobs, Kras and his household
subsisted on $210 per month public assistance received for Kras'
own family and $156 per month public assistance received for his
mother and her daughter.5 Kras, his wife and two young children,
together with his mother and her child, lived in a 21/2-room apart-
ment.' His eight-month-old son had cystic fibrosis and was undergo-
ing hospital treatment.7 Kras' assets consisted of $50 worth of
clothing and household goods.'
In his motion for leave to file his petition in bankruptcy and
proceed without prepayment of any of the fees normally a condition
precedent to a discharge,9 Kras alleged that he was unable to pay
the $50 fee'0 and that he could not promise to pay in installments.
1. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held that failure to waive filing fees for indigents
seeking a divorce in a state court was violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
2. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3. Id. at 450.
4. Id. at 452.
5. Id. at 437-38.
6. Id. at 437.
7. Id.
8. Clothing and household goods are exempt in a bankruptcy proceeding under 11
U.S.C. § 24 (1970) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 5205 (McKinney 1963).
9. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(b)(2), (c)(8), 68(c)(1), 95(g) (1970).
10. Three separate charges are involved: $37 for the referee's salary and expense fund,
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The district court held that the statutory requirement of a prepaid
bankruptcy filing fee would violate Kras' fifth amendment right of
due process, including equal protection." It ordered the petition
filed and referred the proceeding to a referee in bankruptcy.'2 On
appeal by the government,'3 the Supreme Court reversed."
PAUPER PETITIONS IN BANKRUPTCY
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,' fees could be waived at the
time a petition was filed on affidavit of inability to pay. However,
provision for petitions in forma pauperis' was eliminated in 1946
when Congress set up a system of full-time referees paid from a
central fund. 7 The decision to eliminate pauper petitions and re-
place them with a provision for payment on an installment basis
was motivated, in part, by a desire to maintain the self-financing
arrangement of the federal bankruptcy system.'8 To protect further
the fiscal integrity of the bankruptcy system, Congress provided
that all installments must be paid in full before the bankrupt is
eligible for discharge.' 9 Three separate sections of the Act specifi-
cally condition a discharge upon payment of the required fees.20
With the 1946 changes, bankruptcy proceedings are the only
matter in federal courts for which filing fees cannot be waived upon
a showing of poverty.' In addition, since the bankruptcy system is
$10 for compensation of the trustee and $3 for the clerk's services. 11 U.S.C. §§ 68(c)(1),
76(c), 80(a) (1970).
11. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Although the fifth amendment
does not mention equal protection, its principles have been found by the Court to be included
in the amendment's concept of due process. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
12. 331 F. Supp. at 1215.
13. Appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1970).
14. 409 U.S. at 450.
15. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 40(c), 51(2), 30 Stat. 556-59.
16. In the character or manner of a pauoer. The term describes permission given to a
poor person to sue without liability for costs. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 895 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17. See generally S. REP. No. 959, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). For a discussion of in
forma pauperis petitions in bankruptcy, see generally Shaeffer, Proceedings in Bankruptcy
In Forma Pauperis, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (1969).
18. Shaeffer, supra note 17, at 1209.
19. See 11 U.S.C. §9 32(b)(2), (c)(8), 68(c)(1), 95(g) (1970).
20. Id.
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(2) (1970). Although § 1915(a) is seemingly applicable to all
matters in the federal courts, the specific intent of Congress that pauper petitions not be
allowed in bankruptcy proceedings was held to be controlling by the Court. 409 U.S. at 440.
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designed to be self-financing, the $50 bankruptcy filing fee is much
greater than the typical $15 filing fee for civil cases in the federal
courts." Those who, like Kras, are unable to pay even in install-
ments have petitioned the courts for the right to proceed anyway.
SPLIT IN PREVIOUS DECISIONS ON WAIVER OF FEES
Prior to Kras, the two courts deciding the question of whether
to waive the bankruptcy filing fee for indigents had reached opposite
results. The First Circuit, in In re Garland,2 3 did not see the issue
as one involving the right of poor people to gain access to the courts.
Rather, it narrowly defined the issue as involving the right to a
discharge in bankruptcy. 4 The Garland court, in fact, did not even
characterize a bankruptcy proceeding as judicial in nature:
Although bankruptcy is administered in a "court" it is in
most particulars a very unusual court . . . . Referees are
primarily administrators who, together with trustees, ren-
der financial services. A bankruptcy is not litigation in the
normal understanding of the term, but merely a process
under which the bankrupt files a petition, turns over his
assets, if any, and awaits the receipt of a discharge. 5
As a simple governmental service, a bankruptcy discharge was
found to be not a fundamental right, but a privilege to which Con-
gress could attach reasonable conditions. These conditions-the
payment of a fee-only had to bear "a rational relation to the service
offered and to the bankrupt's need for that service."26 The petition
to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee was denied. 7
In contrast to the Garland decision, a district court in In re
Smith5 characterized the issue as one of access to the courts. From
Other services that may be provided for indigents in both civil and criminal cases include
the expense of printing the record on appeal and, at the court's discretion, the employment
of counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (d) (1970). For a discussion of the history and application of
federal in forma pauperis statutes, see Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18
STAN. L. REv. 1270 (1966).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1970).
23. 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 966 (1971).
24. Id. at 1188.
25. Id. at 1187.
26. Id. at 1188.
27. Id.
28. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
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this perspective, bankruptcy was found to be a fundamental inter-
est:
Counsel for the United States argue that bankruptcy is not
a fundamental interest. We agree that, standing alone,
bankruptcy cannot be placed on a par with voting or with
appealing from a criminal conviction. However, we believe
what is at stake here is not simply bankruptcy but access
to court. So viewed, the question presented takes on a
greater significance, at least for those of us who are trained
in the law and who regard the legal system as fundamental
to our way of life. 9
After finding that a bankruptcy discharge was a fundamental inter-
est, the court applied the "compelling interest" test 0 to the require-
ment of filing fees rather than the "rational relation" test 31 utilized
in Garland. On the basis of prior Supreme Court decisions, 3 the
Smith court concluded that it would be difficult to "imagine that
fiscal integrity could ever be described as a compelling interest in
other than grave financial circumstances. '33 As a result, the prepay-
ment requirement was found to be violative of equal protection.
34
WAIVER OF FILING FEES FOR DIVORCE
Intervening between the Garland and Smith decisions and Kras
was the Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut 35 that
state court filing fees for divorce are unconstitutional when required
of indigents.38 Instead of defining the issue as one of general access
29. Id. at 1087.
30. In applying equal protection principles, two standards of justification for the
government-created classifications have been developed by the Supreme Court. The tradi-
tional test, first set out in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911),
requires only that the classification have a reasonable basis. See generally Tussman & ten-
Broek, The Ibquai Protection oi the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). In more recent cases,
the Court has required that the classification be based on a compelling governmental interest
where a fundamental interest is involved. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969); or where the classification is a suspect one of race, nationality or alienage, see, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
31. See sources cited in note 30 supra.
32. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
33. 323 F. Supp. at 1088.
34. Id. at 1093.
35. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
36. Id. at 383.
[Vol. 8
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to the courts, the Court chose a narrow approach and considered the
problems in terms of a right to a divorce. In fact, it carefully limited
its decision to that particular right:
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so
that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before
us this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment
of a fundamental human relationship. The requirement
that those appellants resort to the judicial process is en-
tirely a state-created matter."
Even without a broad characterization of the issue the Court was
able to classify the right to a divorce as a fundamental right. 8 This
conclusion was based on previous acknowledgements by the Court
that marriage involved interests of basic importance to society. 9
Of potentially greater importance than the Supreme Court's
narrow characterization of the access issue in Boddie was its choice
on a second threshold issue: questions of due process, rather than
equal protection, were involved. Discussing the case in terms of due
process allowed the Court to limit strictly its decision. Since due
process involves a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the Court
reasoned that if alternatives other than resort to the judicial process
existed for those seeking a divorce, due process would not be denied
by the imposition of filing fees. Thus, it was the state monopoly over
the marriage relationship, coupled with the financial barrier of filing
fees for divorce, that denied due process for those unable to pay.40
Viewed more broadly, such reasoning led to the pronouncement that
the "legitimacy of the State's monopoly over techniques of final
dispute settlement, even where some are denied access to its use,
stands unimpaired where recognized, effective alternatives for the
adjustment of differences remain.""
The Boddie decision suggested that the poor's access to the
37. Id. at 382-83.
38. Id.
39. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262-u.S. 390 (1923).
40. 401 U.S. at 380-81.
41. Id. at 375-76.
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courts for a particular type of relief may be barred by the imposition
of filing fees or other state-imposed monetary conditions where
there are other remedies available to the litigant. Since the concur-
ring opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan rested on equal pro-
tection as well as on due process, they were not led to this require-
ment of an exclusive judicial remedy.42 For Mr. Justice Brennan, the
case presented "a classic problem of equal protection of the laws ' 41 3
and not just due process:
Certainly, there is at issue the denial of a hearing, a matter
for analysis under the Due Process Clause. But Connecticut
does not deny a hearing to everyone in these circumstances;
it denies it only to people who fail to pay certain fees. The
validity of this partial denial, or differentiation in treat-
ment, can be tested as well under the Equal Protection
Clause.44
Tested under equal protection, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that
the availability of other avenues of relief is of no importance since
courts "are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor
alike."45
No EXTENSION TO BANKRUPTCIES
It was to the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Bren-
nan, rather than to the majority opinion in Boddie, that the district
court looked in deciding that Kras should be allowed to proceed in
bankruptcy without prepayment of the filing fee.4" As a result, the
court characterized the two threshold issues as involving both the
broad question of access to the courts and the application of equal
protection of the laws. 41
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided these two crucial
threshold issues differently and reversed, denying Kras the right to
proceed withou prepayment of the filing fee.4 Writing for the ma-
42. Id. at 383, 386.
43. Id. at 388.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207, 1212-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
47. Id.
48. 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973). One possible method to avoid the result of the Kras
decision is for the indigent bankrupt to admit in writing his inability to pay his debts and
his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt under 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(6) (1970) and to find a
[Vol. 8
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jority, Mr. Justice Blackmun discussed and evaluated the access
issue as one of the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy rather
than a question of general access to the judicial process. He wrote
of Kras' "interest in elimination of his debt burden" and "desired
new start."49 Described in these terms, Kras was found not to be
asking for recognition of a fundamental right:
If Kras is not discharged in bankruptcy, his position will
not be materially altered in any constitutional sense. Gain-
ing or not gaining a discharge will effect no change with
respect to basic necessities. We see no fundamental interest
that is gained or lost depending on the availability of a
discharge in bankruptcy."
Bankruptcy, as opposed to access to the courts, was decided to be
"hardly akin to free speech" or other rights "that the Court has
come to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty require-
ment of a compelling governmental interest before they may be
significantly regulated." 5'
This rejection of a question of general access to the judicial
process was the Court's first threshold choice. Its emphasis on due
process was the second. Although the Court also found no denial of
equal protection in the requirement of a filing fee, 52 its major con-
centration was on the due process considerations raised in Boddie.
Accordingly, the exclusiveness of a bankruptcy proceeding for the
adjustment of debts became important on the Boddie theory' that
the due process "meaningful opportunity" can be satisfied without
resort to the courts if other alternatives are available. Kras' situa-
tion was distinguished from Boddie on this "exclusivity" test:
In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method
creditor or someone else to pay the filing fees. The fees, if paid by creditors in involuntary
cases or by persons other than the bankrupt in voluntary cases, have priority in payment out
of the bankrupt estate second only to the costs and expenses of administration and so may
be recoverable. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970). This approach; however, assumes both a person
willing to pay the fees for the bankrupt, which is unlikely for an indigent bankrupt, and a
bankrupt estate large enough to cover administration costs and filing fees.
49. 409 U.S. at 445.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 446.
52. Id.
53. 401 U.S. at 376-77.
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available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal
relationship with his creditors ...
However unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular
situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may
adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors.
At times the happy passage of the applicable limitation
period, or other acceptable creditor arrangement, will pro-
vide the answer ...
Resort to the court, therefore, is not Kras' sole path to
relief. Boddie's emphasis on exclusivity finds no counter-
part in the bankrupt's situation.5
So distinguished, the Court refused to extend the Boddie ruling to
Kras.55
In dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall, 5 perhaps recognizing the im-
portance of the threshold characterizations of the issues involved in
the case, argued for a wider view on the access question:
I view the case as involving the right of access to the courts,
the opportunity to be heard when one claims a legal right,
and not just the right to a discharge in bankruptcy. When
a person raises a claim of right or entitlement under the
laws, the only forum in our legal system empowered to de-
termine that claim is a court.57
54. 409 U.S. at 445-46.
55. Id. at 450. Mr. Justice Stewart contended that Boddie could not be distinguished
since governmental monopolization of the means of dissolution of one's obligations is just as
complete for indigent bankrupts as for indigents seeking a divorce. Id. at 456 n.7 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). He found the majority's suggestion of alternative remedies for indigent bank-
rupts to be unworkable:
While the creditors of a bankrupt with assets might well desire to reach a compromise
settlement, that possibility is foreclosed to the truly indigent bankrupt. With no
funds and not even a sfflcient nroqnect of income to he Ahle to nrnmi the navment
of a $50 fee in weekly installments of $1.28, the assetless bankrupt has absolutely
nothing to offer his creditors. And his creditors have nothing to gain by allowing him
to escape or reduce his debts; their only hope is that eventually he might make
enough income for them to attach.
Id. at 455.
56. In the 5-4 decision, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion joined in by
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. 409 U.S. at 451. Justices Douglas and Brennan
joined in a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 457. Mr. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate
dissenting opinion. Id. at 458.
57. 409 U.S. at 462.
[Vol. 8
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Kras, Justice Marshall explained, was asserting "a right under the
Bankruptcy Act to be free of any duty to pay his creditors."5 Since
the only way to determine whether he has such a right is by resort
to the judicial process, failure to allow him to do so "denies him
access to the courts.""' Justices Douglas and Brennan joined to
stress the importance of considering the case in the light of equal
protection. They thought that equal protection, as opposed to the
due process approach of the majority, was more explicit in its attack
on unfairness. As a result, they found due process lacking in Kras
because a filing fee "denies equal protection within our decisions
which make particularly 'invidious' discrimination based on wealth
or race."""
IMPLICATIONS OF SUPREME COURT'S CHOICE ON THRESHOLD ISSUES
The Supreme Court's choice on the threshold questions in-
volved in Kras was much more important than the particular deci-
sion itself. By refusing to characterize Kras' petition as one seeking
access to the courts, the Court was able to discuss and compare a
bankruptcy discharge to a divorce. This suggests the approach the
Court intends to take on future access questions: a comparison of
remedies sought on the basis of their "constitutional level."6' Only
for those rights or remedies high enough in the constitutional hier-
archy will free access to the courts be granted to indigents.
Such an approach is troubling for two reasons. First, the task
of deciding which reasons for gaining access to the courts are impor-
tant enough for a waiver of filing fees and which are not is "highly
subjective and dependent on the idiosyncracies of individual
judges."" Justice Black, for example, thought the need to file for a
discharge in bankruptcy was more fundamental than that of a di-
vorce.613 This is the opposite of what the majority decided to be
58. Id. at 463.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 458.
61. Id. at 445.
62. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring in the
result).
63. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 402 U.S.
954, 958 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Black's dissent applied to the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in a number of cases, including Garland, which required further
interpretation of Boddie.
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fundamental in Kras.4 The folly of trying to measure reasons for a
desire to gain access to the courts is pointed to by a hypothetical
proposed in Smith:
[Iff a state or the federal government were to condition the
enforcement of all statutory and common law rights upon
the payment of a $5,000 filing fee, access to court as we now
conceive it would be severely impaired. . . .If we were to
begin attacking the above scheme by deciding that only the
exercise of certain rights could be so conditioned, how
would we make the choice? Would we decide this issue on
the basis of how many people avail themselves of the partic-
ular action? On some other standard for judging the social
importance of the right? How do we devise a scale for mea-
suring the importance of bankruptcy as compared with any
other statutory or common law action? 5
Moreover, it seems that any right or remedy which a person pur-
posely chooses to pursue in the judicial system, the ultimate
dispute-settling mechanism in our society, is certainly fundamental
unless it involves a patently frivolous claim.
The Court's decision to look at access in the narrow context of
what it is that the indigent seeks to litigate is also troubling for a
second reason. By defining the problem as one of the access to the
judicial system for a particular purpose, the majority emasculates
the more general concept of access to the courts. The phrase "access
to the courts" implies the right to bring one's disputes or seek one's
remedies in the ultimate forum established by the state or federal
government for such matters. Even though individuals come to the
courts for specific reasons, the idea of general access is important
in itself and seems to characterize more cogently the issue involved
in cases like Kras. The Smith court was convinced "that the gener-
ality bas mieaning and poses a problem worthy of consideration that
leads us to reject the narrow view." 6
Analysis of Kras' petition primarily in terms of due process,
rather than equal protection, was a second threshold decision made
by the Court. It, too, was a choice of great potential impact. Al-
64. 409 U.S. at 445.
65. 323 F. Supp. at 1089.
66. Id.
[Vol. 8
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though due process and equal protection may be overlapping con-
cepts which differ more in emphasis than in substance, 7 the differ-
ence in emphasis may easily lead to different results. Due process
involves a balancing of the importance of individual rights against
relevant governmental interests, while equal protection focuses on
differences among individuals in relation to the government." Equal
protection analysis, then, more clearly conceptualizes the wide
unevenness with which the rich man and poor man approach the
judicial system.
In addition to its conceptual accuracy for access cases, equal
protection analysis does not necessitate a finding that the judicial
remedy sought by the indigent be the exclusive means of dispute
resolution. Where a fundamental interest is at stake, the Court has
found that any classification based upon wealth is invidious and so
must be carefully scrutinized. Fiscal integrity, or, in the case of
bankruptcy, Congress' intent that the system be self-supporting,
would not survive such a strict review.7" In contrast, the due process
analysis of Boddie involves a two-fold test for recognition of a right
of access: a fundamental interest and the exclusiveness of the judi-
cial remedy.7' If the Court continues to look at access cases as in-
volving questions of due process, rather than equal protection, both
the difficult fundamental interest and exclusive remedy tests will
have to be satisfied.72
CONCLUSION
In Kras, the Supreme Court refused to extend Boddie to an-
other substantive area. Since bankruptcy would have been particu-
larly appropriate for an additional step in recognizing the right of
access to the judicial process, the Kras decision is disturbing.73
67. Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 435, 439 (1967).
68. See generally id.
69. See, e.g., Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
70. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
71. 401 U.S. at 382-83.
72. The difficulty of overcoming both tests is well illustrated in Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973). There, two months after the decision in Kras, the Court denied free
access to Oregon's appellate courts for an indigent seeking to appeal a cut in his old age
assistance payments. Under state law, appeals of welfare agency decisions had to be made
to the Oregon Court of Appeals, which had a $25 filing fee.
73. See Shaeffer, supra note 17. See generally 50 N.C.L. REv. 654 (1972); 60 Gso. L.J.
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What, in effect, the Court decided was "that some of the poor are
too poor even to go bankrupt."74 But even more disturbing is that
the Court postponed indefinitely any recognition of a general right
of access to the courts for rich and poor alike. It thus appears certain
that an indigent's right of access to the judicial process will depend
on what it is that he seeks to litigate. This is an odd result if the
courts of the United States and the states truly belong to the people.
1581 (1972).
74. 409 U.S. at 457 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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